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Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers and Remittances on 
Credit Market Outcomes in Rural Nicaragua 
 
Summary.— The impact of public and private transfers on credit markets has not been sufficiently studied 
and understanding any spill over effects caused by these transfers may be useful for policy makers. This 
paper  estimates  the  impact  of  Conditional  Cash  Transfers  (CCTs)  and  remittances  received  by  poor 
households in rural Nicaragua on their decision to request a loan. We find that, on average, CCTs did not 
affect the request of credit while remittances increased it, controlling for potential endogeneity. We argue 
the reduction in income risk provided by remittances changes borrowers’ expected marginal returns to a 
loan and/or their creditworthiness, as perceived by lenders. The successful enforcement of the use of CCTs 
on  long-term  investments  seems  to  have  avoided  externalities  on  the  use  of  short-term  credit  these 
households have access to and their creditworthiness.  
 
JEL Classification — D14, F22, O15 
 
1. Introduction 
The  outreach  of  public  and  private  transfers  in  poor  rural  areas  of  developing 
countries has been growing considerably in the past decade. Public transfers in the form 
of  Conditional  Cash  Transfer  (CCT)  programs,  like  the  renowned  Oportunidades  in 
Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil, have become a popular way to encourage investment 
in education and health among the rural and urban poor and billions of dollars have been 
spent in order to benefit millions of families.  On the other hand, the availability of 
private transfers in the form of remittances has also been increasing in rural and urban 
areas as a result of an increase in domestic and international migration flows. How these 
transfers may be affecting rural credit markets, through changes in demand and supply, is 
an open question and an answer will help policy makers be aware of the different spill 
over effects these transfers might have. 
This  study  explores  how  these  two  types  of  transfers  are  changing  credit  market 
outcomes  in  rural  Nicaragua.  We  use  panel  data  from  1,359  poor  rural  households 
participating in a randomized CCT program conducted in Nicaragua between 2000 and   3 
2002 named Red de Protección Social. Many of these households had domestic migrants 
sending  remittances  during  the  same  time  period,  as  part  of  their  income  risk 
management  strategies.  We  evaluate  the  impact  that  CCTs  and  having  access  to 
remittances had on the household’s decision to request a loan, considering the exogenous 
nature of the CCT and the endogenous nature of remittances. 
Our findings show that, on average, CCTs did not have a significant effect on the 
likelihood  of  requesting  a  loan,  while  remittances  increased  it.  The  successful 
enforcement of the use of CCTs on long-term investments like education and health, 
shown in the literature
1, seems to have left unchanged expected marginal returns to the 
short-term loans these households have access to or their creditworthiness as perceived 
by lenders. Likewise, any unspent part of the CCT seems to have left unchanged expected 
marginal  returns  to  a  loan  and  the  lender’s  perception  of  the  household’s 
creditworthiness. Remittances, on the other hand, are the result of a household strategy to 
reduce income variability and overcome liquidity constraints. Its positive effect on the 
decision  to  request  a  loan  suggests  access  to  remittances  improved  their  expected 
marginal returns to a loan and/or their creditworthiness as perceived by lenders, through 
the reduction in income risk. This positive effect seems to offset any other substitution 
effect caused by the rise in liquidity that may discourage the request of a loan. These 
results contribute to the New Economics of Labor Migration literature, which emphasizes 
the insurance role of cash transfers. 
                                                 
1 Some of the studies that looking at the impact of several CCT programs including the one studied in 
this paper are Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2006; de Janvry et al., 2006; Olinto and Nielsen, 2006; Glewwe 
and Olinto, 2004; Schultz, 2004; Maluccio and Flores, 2004; Bourgignon et al., 2003). 
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The paper is built in the following way.  Section two presents a theoretical framework 
based on Kochar (1997) and Starks and Levhari (1982) that explains the possible effects 
of cash transfers on the household’s decision to request a loan. Section three describes the 
basic characteristics of the data. Section four discusses some of the main methodological 
challenges  and  the  econometric  methods  used.  Section  five  presents  the  results  and 
discussion and section six concludes. 
2. A stylized theoretical framework 
In this section we present a theoretical framework that explains the determinants of 
the household’s decision to request a loan and how this decision might change after a 
transfer that has a negative covariance with local shocks is received. This model builds 
on the rural credit market model by Kochar (1997) and the New Economics of Labor 
Migration (NELM) models of Stark and Levhari (1982), among others. In the interest of 
brevity, a formal theoretical derivation of the credit demand and supply schedules is 
omitted
2. 
A poor household faces an upward sloping credit supply schedules, 
€ 
L(r,X), which 
defines all pairs of loan size (
€ 
L) and interest rate (
€ 
r) offered to the household given its 
characteristics  (
€ 
X).  This  aggregate  supply  schedule  is  composed  of  the  union  of  the 
formal and informal credit supply schedules that offer the lowest costs to the household at 
any given loan size. The lender’s marginal returns (MR) are composed of the interest rate 
(
€ 
r) and its marginal costs (MC) are composed of the expected loss in the case of default 
of a loan size L plus monitoring and screening costs. Assuming profit maximization, the 
lender will provide a loan if 
€ 
MR = r ≥ MC(L), and in a competitive credit market this 
                                                 
2 A formal derivation of the credit demand and supply schedule in the context of imperfect rural credit 
markets is presented by Kochar (1991) and Kochar (1997).   5 
condition will bind, something we assume in the model. Therefore, the aggregate credit 
supply schedule defines the marginal cost of a lender for any given loan size, 
€ 
MC(L). It 
also defines the opportunity cost (or reservation cost) that must be met before the lender 
agrees to lend any amount to a particular household, 
€ 
MC(L = 0). Notice that 
€ 
L(r,X) 
shifts  with  the  borrower’s  characteristics,  which  implies  that  the  same  occurs  with 
€ 
MC(L). The riskier the lender perceives the borrower then the higher are the expected 
loss and screening and monitoring costs, shifting the 
€ 
MC(L) curve upwards. 




which  gives  all  pairs  of  loan  size  requested  (
€ 
L
D)  at  any  given  interest  rate  (
€ 
r).  The 
downward slopping demand curve is based on the assumption of decreasing expected 
returns to the loan and a household profit maximization behavior, where the household 
expected profit function, 
€ 





= r(L), and a non-negativity constraint, 
€ 
L ≥ 0. This simplified maximization 
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where 
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, the latter set 
by the profit maximizing lender. 
Given that the choice of requesting a loan is discrete between L=0 and L>0, the 
participation constraint is obtained by evaluating (1) at L=0. This yields the standard 
result  that  the  decision  to  request  a  loan  will  be  based  on  the  comparison  of  the 
borrower’s expected marginal returns to resources without the loan, MR(r, L=0), which is   6 
the relevant marginal return the household considers before asking for a loan of any size, 
and the lender’s reservation cost, MC(L=0). Therefore, whether the household requests 
credit or not reflects credit market outcomes because it is the result of the interaction 
between the household’s credit demand, which defines expected marginal returns, and the 
credit supply, which defines the lender’s reservation cost. This abstract view explains the 
decision of some households not to request a loan as they believe their expected marginal 
returns are below the lender’s reservation cost and thus their request would be rejected. 
The  market  equilibrium,  i.e.  the  intersection  between    and  ,  will  be 
determined by the participation constraint and the amount of information the lender has 
about  the  borrower  to  determine  its  creditworthiness.  There  are  different  equilibrium 
outcomes possible, as shown by Kochar (1997), but our focus will rather be directed to 
the participation constraint and how it may change once the household receives a transfer. 
Our extension of this standard model focuses on the different participation outcomes 
that can occur when the amount of resources owned by the household increase due to the 
receipt of a transfer. This implies evaluating how a transfer may change the household’s 
reservation demand, MR(r, L=0), and the reservation cost, MC(L=0).  Figure one shows 
these  two  curves  as  a  function  of  the  household’s  resource  endowment,  R.  The 
household’s reservation demand decreases as the amount of resources increases, ceteris 
paribus, because of the assumption of decreasing returns. Notice this is an assumption 
regarding technology. Therefore, a household with initial resources 
€ 
R0 will be located at 
point A, given its current technological choice. After receiving a transfer, it increases its 
liquidity and now counts with resources 
€ 
R0 + T causing a decrease in expected marginal 
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demand, ex post the transfer, also decreases. This is illustrated as a movement along the 
reservation demand curve from point A to A’ in Figure one.  
Up  to  now,  the  fact  that  the  household’s  reservation  demand  is  based  on  the 
expectation of marginal returns to resources has not been emphasized. This uncertainty 
aspect  makes  the  reservation  demand  curve  dependent  on,  not  only  the  amount  of 
resources the household has, but also on its risk behavior, which is a key determinant of 
the  household’s  technological  choice.  Household  members  choose  a  production 
technology, or income generating activities, that may not be very productive relative to 
other  choices  available  but  reduces  the  risk  of  failure  in  accordance  with  a  risk-
management strategy that aims to reduce income variability (Stark and Levhari 1982; 
Lucas,  1987;  Dercon,  2002;  Mendola,  2008).  This  fundamental  thesis  of  the  NELM 
literature applied to our context suggests that the household’s risk management strategy 
will determine its productivity level and a change in its risk behavior may change its 
technological choice, shifting the reservation demand schedule. 
Lower  exposure  to  income  risk  may  allow  household  members  to  increase  their 
ability to adopt more productive, but perhaps more risky, income generating activities in 
the future (Mendola, 2008), which would increase expected marginal returns and shift the 
€ 
MR(r, L = 0, R) curve upwards. However, there is also the possibility of this shift to be 
downwards if access to the transfer implies a loss in efficiency for the household, such 
that receiving the transfer (think of it as remittances in this case) reduces income risk, but 
at the expense of the transfer itself representing a lower return relative to other more 
productive, but riskier, activities available in the home community (Taylor and Martin, 
2001; Dercon 2002).   8 
On  the  supply  side,  the  lender’s  reservation  cost,  MC(L=0,  R),  falls  with  the 
household’s  initial  amount  of  resources  increases,  ceteris  paribus.  This  theoretical 
statement is based on the fact that as the pool of resources owned by the household 
increases relative to the loan size, L, the losses in case of default are lower because of the 
availability of collateral. Therefore, in Figure one, the 
€ 
MC(L = 0,R) curve is downward 
sloping.  The  position  of  this  reservation  cost  curve  is  also  affected  by  lender’s 
expectations because reservations costs are composed of the expected loss from providing 
the  loan  plus  monitoring  and  screening  costs.  And  the  way  the  lender  forms  its 
expectations is by considering the borrower’s set of characteristics, X. The riskier the 
lender  perceives  the  borrower  the  higher  are  the  expected  loss  and  screening  and 
monitoring costs, shifting the reservation cost curve, 
€ 
MC(L = 0,R), upwards. 
If the transfer received by the household were to lower the household’s exposure to 
risk  and  increase  the  borrower’s  expected  marginal  returns  on  a  loan,  and  if  this 
information is available to the lender then her expected loss in providing the loan would 
decrease, shifting the reservation cost curve downward. That is, the lender’s perception of 
the  borrower’s  creditworthiness  improves.  Notice  that  if  the  transfer  reduces  the 
household’s expected marginal returns to a loan or if this kind of information is simply 
not  available  to  the  lender,  then  the  reservation  cost, 
€ 
MC(L = 0,R),  faced  by  the 
household may shift upwards or remain unchanged after the transfer. 
In summary a transfer may modify the household’s decision to request a loan through 
a combination of three channels: A movement along the reservation demand and/or the 
reservation cost schedule (due to the effect of decreasing marginal returns to a loan and 
the availability of collateral), a change in the demand for credit (a shift of the reservation   9 
demand schedule) or a change in the household’s credit supply (a shift in the reservation 
cost schedule). Therefore, the effect of a periodic transfer on the household’s decision to 
request a loan is ambiguous from a theoretical perspective and determining this effect is 
an empirical exercise. 
Both CCTs and remittances are transfers that help overcome liquidity constraints but 
they have different characteristics that may cause totally different effects on credit market 
outcomes. CCTs are the result of a policy intervention exogenous to household decisions 
and access to this transfer implies meeting a specific set of conditions, which are defined 
by  the  CCT  program.  Remittances,  on  the  other  hand,  are  the  result  of  a  household 
migration strategy to diversify income risk and overcome liquidity constraints (Starks 
and Levhari, 1982). The transfer’s characteristics could determine which of the channels 
mentioned above dominates, causing a different impact on the household’s credit request. 
3. The RPS data 
To test the theoretical framework we use data from the RPS. This program began 
with a pilot phase carried out between 2000 and 2002, and it continued with a second 
phase from 2003 to 2005. It was funded by the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the Nicaraguan Government. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
was in charge of the impact evaluation of the pilot phase and the data collected are 
publicly available. 
The program consisted of the provision of a food security transfer of US$224 per year 
to those households in the treatment group. If these households had children between the 
ages of seven and thirteen years who had not completed the fourth grade, they received 
an additional school attendance transfer of US$133 per year and US$21 per child per year   10 
for school supplies. These transfers were given mostly to mothers and were conditional 
on the mother’s attendance to periodic health workshops, minimum improvements in 
child  health  indicators,  children’s  school  attendance  and  children’s i ntake  of  anti-
parasites, vitamins and vaccines. On average, beneficiary households received $300 per 
year, which is substantial given the poverty level of participants (Maluccio and Flores, 
2004). This study uses the data collected for the pilot phase. Year 2000 is the baseline 
year (before treatment) and years 2001 and 2002 are the after treatment periods. The 
targeted  population  consisted  of  poor  rural  households  living  in  the  regions  or 
departamentos of Madriz and Matagalpa, in Northern Nicaragua (Maluccio and Flores, 
2004). The implementation of the randomization process adopted a block design, and 42 
comarcas,  or  groups  of  communities,  were  selected  to  participate  in  the  experiment. 
These were stratified in seven groups of six comarcas each, such that each stratum had a 
similar poverty index. Randomization was implemented within each stratum of six to 
ensure that the probability of being selected for the control or treatment group is the same 
for all strata, making treatment status random over the whole population of 42 comarcas 
(Maluccio and Flores, 2004). It also ensures that the comparison and treatment group are 
balanced according to the poverty index, reducing the variance of estimated treatment 
effects (Duflo et al., 2007). 
Table one shows attrition levels for the control and treatment groups for the baseline 
and  follow-up  surveys.  Total  attrition  among  treatment  and  control  groups  in  the 
balanced  panel  looks  similar,  which  may  favor  comparability.  However,  the 
randomization of the sample is valid only as long as this attrition is itself random. During 
the implementation of the program there were some cases of non-compliance. Although   11 
nobody assigned to the control group was treated, some assigned to the treatment group 
were not treated, as they refused to participate. Still they participated in the surveys. In 
the  target  group  of  1,764  households,  4.8  percent  of  the  households  assigned  to  the 
treatment group did not receive it. In the balanced panel, only 2.6% of the households in 
the treatment group were not treated. 
4. Data analysis and econometric model 
4.1 Verification of randomization and general characteristics of the sample 
The  first  step  in  this  evaluation  is  to  verify  if  attrition  was  random.  Given  that 
baseline data are available, we can compare attritors with non-attritors, to see if there are 
systematic differences between them, that would bias results. For example, it is possible 
that those not so poor households that benefited from the program were able to migrate 
locally to other communities with better job opportunities, which would underestimate 
impact measures. Alternatively, those households benefiting the least from the RPS may 
have dropped out, which would imply an overestimation of impact measures. 
In order to test whether attrition was random, we use a linear probability model with a 
binomial dependent variable equal to one if the household failed to participate in any of 
the follow-up surveys and equal zero otherwise. The independent variables will be key 
observable variables available in the data that may systematically differ across the two 
types of households. The null hypothesis that all parameter estimates are jointly zero will 
be tested with an F statistic. If attrition is random, then we should fail to reject the null. 
This analysis is repeated for the treatment and control group in the balanced panel 
(after attrition) to verify that randomization was effective in the final sample used for the 
evaluation. The key observable variables and the results of the F-test for attrition and   12 
treatment are shown in Table two. This analysis is complemented by a mean difference 
test between attritors and non-attritors, as well as for the control and treatment groups; 
and results are shown in Table three. 
The F-statistics obtained and some of the t-values from the mean difference test are 
significant suggesting that attrition was likely non-random leaving significant differences 
between control and treatment groups. Those households that were benefited by social 
programs other than RPS, were members of local community organizations and had more 
durable and non-durable assets were more likely to answer the follow up surveys, i.e. 
conform  the  cohort  of  non-attritors.  Those  worst  off  families  that  did  not  have  this 
additional support or advantages were more likely to skip some of these surveys, perhaps 
because their relative vulnerability made it difficult for them to meet the implicit costs of 
participating in RPS activities. On the other hand, looking only at the balanced panel we 
find that control and treatment groups had small, but significant, differences. The control 
group tended to be composed of those younger households that had lower per capita 
consumption and that were more likely to request a loan (probably due to their need to 
cope with shocks). This suggests that, within the subgroup of non-attritors, those worse 
off households were, again, less likely to be able to meet the implicit costs attached to the 
receipt of CCTs. 
Table three also provides us with a general idea of the level of poverty of households 
in  the  sample.  Household  members  participating  in  RPS  are  characterized  by  being 
young. The average age in each household was 23 years and the median was 16 (not 
shown). Their request for loans was infrequent. Around 17 percent of the households 
requested  a  loan  during  the  12  months  before  the  baseline  survey.  Following  our   13 
theoretical framework, the proxy we use to determine results on credit market outcomes 
is whether the household requested a loan or not. In addition, the survey asks whether the 
loan was requested from formal sources (banks, NGOs or credit cooperatives) or informal 
sources  (such  as  relatives,  neighbors,  friends,  money  lenders,  input  suppliers,  crop 
buyers, and the like), which cover most of the places where the households may seek 
credit. Although there is great heterogeneity in the type of credit suppliers for the poorest 
population  in  rural  Nicaragua,  loans  from  these  sources  are  characterized  by  having 
short-term  repayment  periods.  Dauner,  1998,  is  perhaps  the  most  comprehensive 
documentation of the characteristics of rural financial markets in Nicaragua. She reports 
that 90 percent of the loans granted to a representative group of rural households during 
1995 had a repayment period of less than a year. Among the poorest sector of the rural 
population, the campesinos, the only use reported for these short-term loans were the 
purchase  of  fertilizer  and  seed,  and  for  consumption.  Loans  with  repayment  periods 
greater than a year seemed to be exclusively used for the purchase of cattle but none of 
the households that requested these loans were categorized as the poorest. 
Households  participating  in  RPS  work  mostly  in  agricultural  activities,  but  in  12 
percent of the households there is some sort of microenterprise. The value of durable and 
non-durable goods averaged 385 Cordobas (about US$30 at September of 2000 official 
average  exchange  rate  of  12.85).  This  value  includes  furniture,  a  wide  range  of 
electronics, agricultural tools, sewing machines, bicycles and motor vehicles. Household 
annual per capita consumption averaged 3,900 Cordobas (about US$304), which is less 
than a dollar per day. This consumption captures basic needs such as food, housing, 
transportation, education and utilities.   14 
In 2000, about seven percent of households in RPS reported having a migrant who 
could  send  them  remittances,  either  periodically  or  only  during  times  of  need.  The 
concept of remittances used in the survey was that of some help, either in cash or in kind, 
from  relatives  or  friends  that  emigrated  domestically  or  internationally.  For  those 
households that reported having received remittances during 2000, the annual average 
amount was of 2,058 Cordobas (about US$160). Table three shows a lower average value 
because it also includes those households that do not have access to remittances, which 
was necessary to compute the t-statistic. When analyzing the balanced panel, we find that 
household’s access to remittances (where access refers to having a migrant who is able to 
send them remittances either periodically or just in case of need) was not constant during 
the three-year period. There were 230 households that had access to remittances during at 
least one of the observed years. From those, only three (or 1.3 percent) reported access to 
remittances during all of the years observed. The remaining households reported access 
only during some of these years. In addition, 90 percent of the 230 households report 
remittances come from domestic migration, 15 percent come from international migration 
(namely from El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica), and five percent come from both 
types of migration. Looking at the households that reported the receipt of remittances, the 
frequency with which these are received varies. Although the majority of them are sent 
on a monthly basis, as shown in table four, some households report receiving them once 
every semester or once every year. It seems some households receive remittances only 
when  the  migrant  is  able  to  send  them  or  when  the  households  suffers  a  specific 
idiosyncratic shock. In some years, there were households that reported having a migrant 
that could send remittances in case of need but claimed they had not actually received   15 
remittances in the past 12 months. It is possible that households falsely believed the CCT 
would  be  taken  away  if  they  reported  the  receipt  of  transfers  aimed  at  helping  the 
households in times of need, and slowly realized this was not the case. This might explain 
the curious fact that the percentage of households that had a migrant but reported no 
remittances decrease steadily to zero over the three-year period, as shown in table four.  
In  summary,  these  rural  households  are  characterized  by  having  young  members. 
They  make  little  use  of  credit  and  have  low  access  to  remittances.  They  would  be 
categorized as very poor when using as a threshold an average per capita consumption of 
less than a dollar a day. These characteristics coincide well with the livelihood of the 
poor in many parts of the world as described by Banerjee and Duflo (2006). 
4.2 Non-compliance and the effect on the treated 
During the implementation of the RPS, not all households assigned to the treatment 
group were actually treated, but it would be incorrect to eliminate them from the analysis 
as  this  may  cause  selection  bias.  Therefore,  in  the  balanced  panel  we  use  all  those 
households initially randomized to the treatment group, even if not all of them were 
treated.  By  doing  so,  the  parameter  estimate  obtained  is  the  intention-to-treat,  which 
should  be  lower  than  the  actual  impact  on  the  treated.  Since  only  2.6  percent  of 
households in the treatment group were not treated, the difference between the intention-
to-treat and the true impact estimates is expected to be small. 
4.3 The double-difference impact estimate  
In section 4.1, we presented several tests that suggest there are intrinsic observable 
differences  between  treatment  and  control  groups  in  the  balanced  panel,  despite 
randomization,  which  violates  the  conditions  under  which  OLS  impact  estimates  are   16 
valid.  But  these  differences  can  be  controlled  for  with  the  double  difference  (DD) 
technique, widely used under experimental settings (Ravallion, 2001). In addition, the 
DD technique controls for time-invariant unobservable differences. For example, it is 
possible that treatment is correlated to household members’ unobserved entrepreneurship 
level  or  knowledge  of  local  markets,  which  may  be  determinants  of  the  decision  to 
request a loan. 
The main assumption of the DD technique is that of a parallel trend. That is, DD 
estimates  are  unbiased  as  long  as  the  average  change  in  the  difference  between  the 
outcome variable in the control and treatment group would have been the same had the 
program not been implemented (Bertrand et al., 2004). There is no reason to think this 
assumption would not hold given that treatment assignment was randomized. 
Following Duflo et al. (2007), the specification we use to estimate the DD impact 
estimate is given below: 
€ 
Yit =α + β t1 + φ t2 + γ Pi +δa t1 Pi +δb t2 Pi +εit (5) 





dummies for the years 2001 and 2002, once the program was implemented. Pi has a value 
of  1  if  the  household  was  assigned  to  the  treatment  group,  and  zero  otherwise.  The 
parameters of interest are  a δ and  b δ , which represent the mean program effects for 2001 
and 2002 relative to 2000. The random error of the estimated equation is given by  . 
Another, quite different, issue that we deal with is non-random attrition, which we 
also found evidence for in section 4.1. To get an idea of the bias in our DD estimates 
caused by ignoring those attritors, we compute the DD estimates with the balanced and 
unbalanced panel and compare their magnitude. The impact estimate obtained from the 
  
 it  17 
unbalanced panel would capture the effect of CCTs on credit request for those attritors, at 
least in some of the years in which they were observed. The difference in magnitude 
between this estimate from the one obtained by using the balanced panel should indicate 
the  direction  of  the  bias.  Table  five  shows  the  result  of  this  comparison.  All  of  the 
parameter  estimates  obtained  using  the  balanced  panel  were  consistently  higher  than 
those obtained from the unbalanced panel. However significance levels remain the same 
using both data sets. This suggests there may be an upward bias in the impact estimates if 
we  ignore  attritors.  We  make  the  same  comparison  of  the  effect  of  CCTs  on  other 
variables  such  as  per  capita  consumption,  consumption  per  capita,  participation  in 
programs  other  than  RPS,  and  value  of  durable  and  non-durable  goods.  Results  (not 
shown) are consistent, showing a higher impact estimate when the balanced panel is used. 
These findings, together with results in section 4.1, suggest those households that were 
benefiting the most from RPS tend to compose the group of non-attritors, which are not 
necessarily the poorest households in the sample, as the latter may find the implicit costs 
attached to CCTs too high to continue participating. 
An important consideration in this case, is the fact that the RPS randomized treatment 
at the community level, not at the household level. This creates a problem of grouped 
error terms that may cause the variance covariance matrix of the OLS estimation of (5) to 
be block-diagonal with correlation among error terms within each comarca cell.    18 
 
To get an improvement in the estimation of standard errors we use bootstrapping
3 as 
shown by Efron and Tibshirani (1994). Equation (5) is estimated using linear probability 
model  because  effects  are  more  tractable,  easier  to  interpret  and  flexible  in  handling 
unobserved heterogeneity relative to tobit or logit models (Hyslop, 1999; de Janvry et al., 
2006).  
4.5 The two-stage-least squares impact estimate and the instrumental variable 
As we mentioned in section 2, remittances are the result of a household migration 
strategy to diversify income risk and overcome liquidity constraints (Starks and Levhari, 
1982).  This  makes  remittances  endogenous  when  determining  their  impact  on  the 
decision to request a loan and the impact magnitude cannot be estimated in the same way 
as we did when looking at CCTs.  
To control for the self-selection problem of migration and access to remittances we 
use two-stage least squares (2SLS) with an instrumental variable (IV) to estimate the 
impact, or ‘potential impact’, of remittances on the decision to request a loan. In the 
household  sample  used,  remittances  come  mostly  from  temporary  and  domestic 
migration. Thus any inference is limited to this particular type of migration, which seems 
prevalent  among  the  poorest  rural  households  in  developing  countries  (Banerjee  and 
Duflo, 2006; Mendola, 2008). The 2SLS can also help deal with the reverse causality 
                                                 
3 This correction of standard errors was found to be robust on panel data from randomized experiments 
by Bertrand et al. (2004). In practice we take 200 random household samples with replacement and, for 
each household, we keep the entire time series of dependant variables, explanatory variables, and time and 
household dummies. For every random sample we compute our estimated parameters,  , where j is the 
independent  variable  of  interest.  We  then  compute  the  bootstrapped  standard  error  as: 
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issue between the use of credit and remittances (Angrist, 2001). Both are determined by 
many of the same explanatory variables and therefore may be influenced by each other: a 
household may request a loan to cover the transaction costs of migrating.  On the other 
hand,  the  fact  that  the  household  has  a  migrant  sending  remittances  may  change  the 
decision to request a loan, as elaborated in section 2. Since the survey available collects 
information of credit requests and access to remittances during the same time periods we 
cannot distinguish which one came first. 
 We  begin  by  taking  the  household  as  the  unit  of  analysis,  including  all  migrant 
members. This follows the NELM theoretical framework that conceptualizes migration as 
a  strategy  of  the  whole  spatially  diversified  family.  Then  we  estimate  the  following 




s +α1t1 +α2t2 +δat1Pi +δbt2Pi +α3Xit +α4Mit +εit
Mit =ω0
s h
s +ω1t1 +ω2t2 +δat1Pi +δbt2Pi +ω3XMit +ω4Zit +εMit




s  are  household  fixed  effects  to  capture  observable  and  unobservable  time-
invariant heterogeneity; 
€ 
t1,2 are year dummies for 2001 and 2002 that capture contextual 
variables common to all households; δa and δb are the impact estimates of CCTs on the 
decision to request a loan in 2002 and 2003, which we include as a robustness check of 
DD estimates; 
€ 
Xit are a set of time-variant observable characteristics influencing the 
decision to request a loan; and 
€ 
εit is the random error of the estimated equation. 
The  ‘first  stage’  equation  determines  the  endogenous  variable 
€ 
Mit  equal  to  1  if 





t1,2 are, again, household and time fixed effects; δa and δb are CCTs impact 
estimates on access to remittances in 2002 and 2003; 
€ 
XMit is a set of observable time-  20 
variant  characteristics  that  influence  access  to  remittances  from  migrants; 
€ 
ZMit  is  an 
exogenous variable used as an instrument for the endogenous remittances variable; and 
€ 
εMit is the equation’s random error term. 
The  set 
€ 
XMit  has  a  union  with  set 
€ 
Xit  and  both  sets  are  selected  based  on  the 
migration and financial literature. It suggests the receipt of remittances and credit use are 
determined by household and family characteristics, such as: 
1.  Number of males, females and children living in the household. This is a proxy 
for labor endowment. The literature suggests larger labor endowment allows for 
the possibility of diversifying spatially while allowing those members that remain 
home to subsist. It may also relate to the household’s production capacity and thus 
influence the decision to request a loan. Differentiation between male, female and 
children (under six years) is made to consider work role assignment given gender 
and age. 
2.  Average age in the household. This is a proxy for experience and knowledge, 
which is suggested by the literature to determine the ability to migrate by favoring 
the possibility of finding work outside the community and be familiar with the 
logistics of migrating. In addition, experience and knowledge are also considered 
to determine credit market participation. 
3.  Whether the home plot is owned or not (with and without title) and a self-reported 
measure of its value. This is a proxy for wealth, which would facilitate covering 
transaction costs either to request credit or reduce living costs that would free up 
cash  for  migration.  We  argue  it  is  exogenous  given  the  relatively  thin  land 
markets in rural Nicaragua (Deininger et al., 2003). Another proxy of wealth to be   21 
used is the value of durable goods obtained before any of the surveys took place
4. 
Durable  goods  include  agricultural  tools,  vehicles  (car,  tractor,  motorcycle, 
bicycle), furniture, a wide variety of electronics, maize grinder, sowing machine, 
kitchen, oven and refrigerator. These proxies are crucial for our analysis as they 
are widely recognized to determine household participation in rural credit markets 
and migration. 
4.  Whether the household suffered a self-reported idiosyncratic shock. The survey 
reports specific household shocks such as theft, lack of work, low yield, presence 
of a drought or a flood and bad coffee prices. The literature suggests the presence 
of idiosyncratic shocks is one of the main motivations to insure, and migration 
and credit have been considered mechanisms to prevent and/or cope with these 
shocks. 
5.  Whether any member of the household has been benefited by socio-economic 
programs  other  than  RPS.  We  account  for  the  possibility  of  other  programs 
present in the communities might be providing some sort of transfers or benefits 
that facilitated migration or influenced the decision to request a loan. 
6.  Access to social networks. Another variable included is whether any member of 
the  household  participates  in  a  community  organization  (either  a  production 
cooperative,  a  social  development,  woman  empowerment,  sport  or  religious 
group,  among  others).  This  is  a  proxy  for  the  household’s  social  connections 
within the community, which the literature suggests is an important mean through 
                                                 
4 To avoid endogeneity issues between the value of durable goods and migration we consider the reported 
value of those durable goods that were owned by the household before any of the three surveys took place. 
Therefore we are considering durable goods that were acquired before the observed decision to request a 
loan and migrate.   22 
which  credit  might  be  obtained.  Karlan  (2007)  provides  evidence  that  greater 
social connections enable household members to signal their risk type to lenders 
and have greater access to credit. 
7.  Whether a microenterprise exists in the household, which provides goods and 
services. The presence of such an activity may motivate household members to 
request a loan to finance the costs of running the business or making investments. 
The key part of our analysis is finding an instrument, 
€ 
ZMit, that is highly correlated 
with access to remittances but not correlated with the household’s decision to request a 
loan, such that the influence of remittances on this decision is obtained only through this 
instrument. The IV procedure would allow us to produce consistent estimates by taking 
into account the correlation in the disturbances across the two equations in (7) (Angrist, 
2001).  
The IV we are proposing is the percentage of households in the home community 
participating in migration in a given year. This is a proxy for the migration networks that 
households have access to, which have been shown to reduce the transaction costs of 
migrating, create job referrals, and allow learning about economic opportunities outside 
the community.  Some of the work on migrant networks shows that households with 
indirect experience with migration are more likely to move and settle better abroad, and 
these  advantages  sometime  represent  stronger  incentives  to  migrate  than  economic 
reasons (Massey et al., 1993; Munshi, 2003). 
The participation constraint that triggers the decision to request a loan, on the other 
hand, consist of a comparison between the expected marginal returns on resources and 
the marginal cost of a loan that each household faces. This participation constraint should   23 
not be affected by the prevalent number of migrants that do not belong to the household, 
except through the indirect effect they have on the household’s migration behavior. This 
as long as migrant networks do not have general equilibrium effects. 
The orthogonality of the IV with the decision to request a loan should be enhanced by 
the fact that we are using panel data that allows us to control for intrinsic differences 
between communities through two-way fixed effects. 
We are able to check the robustness of the 2SLS procedure by adding to equation (7) 
time-community fixed effects, which control for shocks at the community level averaging 
9 households in each of the 152 communities included in the sample. Since remittances 
and credit are likely correlated with shocks, it is important to control for these as best as 
possible. To be able to incorporate these time-community effects we modify the IV to the 
percentage of households in the home comarca participating in migration in a given year. 
Here we change the geographical coverage of our IV from a community to a comarca. 
The latter has a greater geographical coverage since it is an administrative area within a 
municipality that includes between two and five communities. 
We conduct a Hauseman test to provide some evidence validating the IVs used. We 
also verify if migrant networks had any significant effect on the decision to request a loan 
for the subgroup of households that did not have access to remittances in any of the years 
observed. If remittances affect the decision to request a loan only through the IV, then 
households that do not have access to migrant networks should decide to request a loan 
independently of the existence of migrant networks in their communities or comarcas. 
The parameter estimate 
€ 
α4 in (7) is the one of interest, as it represents the impact, or 
potential impact, of access to remittances on the decision to request a loan. We will use   24 
Generalized Least Squares to determine equation (7) given the ease of interpretation it 
provides  and  its  flexibility  under  unobserved  heterogeneity  (Angrist,  2001;  Hysloop, 
1999). 
5. Results and discussion 
Table five reports the DD impact estimation of RPS on the decision to request a loan. 
The  parameters  of  interest  a δ and  b δ are  statistically  insignificant  suggesting  that,  on 
average, the receipt of CCTs did not modify the households’ decision to request a loan. 
Neither the sign nor the significance of parameters changes whether we use the balanced 
or unbalanced panel, which is why the issue of attrition bias has little relevance for our 
main results. 
In the context of our theoretical framework, these findings support the scenario where 
the CCTs did not change the position of expected marginal returns to a loan relative to its 
expected marginal cost, through any of the channels mentioned in section two. Since 
households successfully followed the RPS recommendation of investing in education and 
health, which are long-term investments, the use of CCTs seems to be unrelated to the 
use  of  the  shorter-term  credit  products  that  these  households  have  access  to.  If,  on 
average, these households were using credit for expenses on education and health, then 
we  would  have  expected  the  receipt  of  CCTs,  which  are  a  subsidy,  to  diminish  the 
likelihood of requesting a costly loan. This does not seem to be happening. Likewise, any 
unspent  part  of  the  transfer  does  not  seem  enough  to  change  expectations  regarding 
marginal returns to a loan and its marginal costs. Therefore the use of CCTs on long-term 
investments (that would have not been done if the transfer had not been received) seems 
to avoid CCTs having any effect on the household’s shorter-term credit use.   25 
Table six presents the first and second stage regressions results to estimate the impact 
of remittances on the decision to request a loan. Column I in this table shows those 
significant characteristics that determine whether households in the sample have access to 
remittances or not. We find that the receipt of CCTs had a positive and significant effect 
on the households’ access to remittances only in year 2002, although only at the ten 
percent level. It is possible that, over time, households receiving CCTs may be able to 
save a fraction of the transfer to finance the cost of migrating. The number of household 
members  is  a  significant  determinant,  but  when  decomposed  by  the  number  of  men, 
women and children, only the number of men in the household influenced in a significant 
way.  The  negative  parameter  suggests  that  as  more  men  compose  the  household  the 
likelihood of accessing remittances by migrating decreases. Therefore, work assignment 
by gender seems prevalent in these rural communities and, even though more members 
facilitate the geographic diversification of the household, the opportunities of temporary 
migrating domestically do not seem to be as rewarding as the opportunities within the 
community when there are more men in the household. This is consistent with findings 
showing returns to domestic and temporary migration are low relative to some economic 
activities in the home community or to international and permanent migration (Dercon, 
2002; Mendola, 2008). Characteristics like average age in household, homeownership 
and the (self-reported) value of the home plot are not significant but the parameters have 
a positive sign in accordance with the literature. The proxy of a more liquid form of 
wealth such as the value of durable and non-durable goods (owned before any of the 
surveys took place) was significant and positive, as expected. Household shocks were not 
significant  but,  in  accordance  with  theory,  the  parameter  has  a  positive  sign.  Low   26 
significance may be due to the limited types of shocks reported by the survey, and hints 
at  the  need  to  complement  the  measurement  of  idiosyncratic  shocks.  In  addition, 
household  participation  in  social  programs  other  than  RPS  shows  a  positive  and 
significant influence on access to remittances, suggesting their wealth effects may include 
covering the cost of migration. Our instrumental variable, which is a proxy for migrant 
networks, positively and significantly influences the receipt of remittances, consistent 
with the literature.  
The  second  stage  regression,  shown  in  column  II  of  table  six,  presents  the 
determinants  of  the  household’s  credit  request.  Receipt  of  CCTs  did  not  seem  to 
influence the decision to request a loan, providing some robustness to the DD impact 
estimates. Stronger determinants of credit request seem to be the value of durable and 
non-durable good, participation in community organizations, and participation in social 
programs other than RPS. But we suspect the significance of the latter is due to the 
correlation of these programs with local shocks in the community, as government and 
donors react to these shocks by implementing social program in the areas affected. Table 
seven shows the percentage of households participating in these social programs and their 
purpose. These social programs are temporary and vary from year to year, suggesting 
they are implemented where most needed and when funds are available. 
The parameter for the predicted value of access to remittances generated in the first 
stage, which isolates the exogenous component of access to remittances, is significant 
with a large positive magnitude. The reduction in income risk seems to allow households 
to either increase their expected marginal returns to a loan, through the possibility of 
engaging in more productive but riskier income generating activities, or improve their   27 
creditworthiness as seen by lenders; or both. In either case, the effect of this shift in 
expectations seems to offset the decreasing marginal returns household face, given the 
rise in liquidity, which has an effect that discourages the request of a loan. 
The  Hausman  test  for  endogeneity  yields  a  Hausman  statistic  of  6.7,  therefore 
rejecting  the  null  that  both  OLS  and  IV  estimates  are  consistent  and  favoring  the 
alternative, which is that the IV estimates are consistent. Results in column III of table six 
provide  some  support  that  migrant  networks  are  not  a  significant  determinant  of  the 
decision to request a loan for those households that do not have access to remittances. 
This result is consistent with the fundamental condition required for our IV. The rest of 
the  parameters  in  this  column  have  a  similar  magnitude  and  the  same  degree  of 
significance as those obtained in the full household sample, except for the parameter of 
existence of a microenterprise, which is still positive but now significant. 
Table eight shows results after adding time-community fixed effects to both stages of 
equation  (7)  and  changing  the  geographic  coverage  of  our  IV  to  the  comarca  level 
(otherwise  the  IV  at  community  level  would  be  absorbed  by  the  time-community 
dummy). The significant determinants of access to remittances do not change relative to 
our previous results but the determinants of credit request do. The value of durable and 
non-durable  goods  and  the  participation  in  social  programs  other  than  RPS  become 
insignificant,  perhaps  because  they  were  absorbing  some  of  the  effect  of  unobserved 
community  shocks.  On  the  other  hand,  the  existence  of  a  microenterprise  becomes 
significant, as hinted by results in column III of table six. The changes suggest time-
community effect should be considered.  The parameter for access to remittances is larger 
in  magnitude  than  previously  estimated  and  still  highly  significant,  providing  some   28 
robustness to our main findings. Evidence for the validity of our IV continues to hold 
after including time-community effects. 
The average impact of CCTs and remittances on the decision to request a loan is 
different  despite  the  fact  that  both  of  these  transfers  are  temporary.  We  argue  the 
temporary aspect of both transfers rules out effects on households’ permanent income, 
which  is  why  we  do  not  believe  permanent  income  effects  can  explain  the  different 
impact on credit request. We did find, however, that CCTs consistently favored access to 
remittances only in the last year of our panel, and since access to remittances is found to 
increase the request of credit, then it is possible that CCTs may have an indirect effect on 
the decision to request a loan over time only through its effect on access to remittances. 
6. Conclusions 
The main purpose of this paper is to empirically explore how remittances and CCTs 
affect the decision of requesting a loan for poor households participating in the RPS, a 
CCT program implemented in Nicaragua. This household decision reveals changes in 
credit market outcomes by changing the household’s expected marginal returns to a loan 
(determinant of demand) and/or changing its creditworthiness as evaluated by lenders 
(determinant of supply). Double difference impact estimates suggest CCTs did not have a 
significant  impact  on  the  household’s  request  for  credit.  However,  the  impact  of 
remittances on the likelihood of requesting a loan seems to be significant and positive, as 
shown  by  the  results  of  our  two-stage  least  squares  regressions  with  an  instrumental 
variable. 
The  successful  enforcement  of  the  use  of  CCTs  on  long-term  investments  like 
education  and  health  seems  to  have  left  unchanged  expected  marginal  returns  to  the   29 
short-term  loans  these  households  have  access  to;  and  also  the  household’s 
creditworthiness, as seen by lenders. Remittances on the other hand, are the result of a 
household strategy to reduce income variability and overcome liquidity constraints. Its 
positive effect on the decision to request a loan suggests the reduction in income risk is 
allowing households to either increase their expected marginal returns to a loan, through 
the possibility of engaging in more productive but riskier income generating activities, or 
improve their creditworthiness as seen by lenders; or both. In either case, this positive 
effect seems to offset the more intuitive effect of decreasing returns to resources caused 
by the rise in liquidity, which disfavors the decision to request a loan. 
Given the information available, we are unable to isolate the impact on credit demand 
and supply separately, we can only estimate a net or market outcome effect. This is part 
of further research we are conducting. In addition, although we determine that the overall 
conditionality of this CCT program seems to have avoided externalities on credit market 
outcomes, we cannot distinguish which of the conditions implicit in RPS are the critical 
ones. Finally, our analysis is restricted to the sample surveyed during the evaluation of 
the RPS. This was a stratified random sample of the communities selected to participate 
in the CCT program. Therefore external validity may not hold. 
The policy implication is that by successfully enforcing the use of CCTs on long-term 
investments, externalities on household’s credit use were avoided. Remittances, on the 
other  hand,  seem  to  be  increasing  the  likelihood  of  requesting  a  loan  probably  by 
changing borrowers and lenders expectations.   30 
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Figure 1. Reservation demand and cost curves for a given household at several levels 
of resource endowments, R. In this graphical example, the transfer T causes 
the household to avoid a loan, since the reservation demand is smaller than 
the reservation cost at point A’. There is no effect on expectations and the 




MR(r, L=0, R) 
MR, MC 
Ro  R  Ro + T   34 
Table  1.  Households  participating  in  the  RPS  baseline  and  follow-up  surveys 
(percentage of attrition shown in parenthesis). 










































Source: Maluccio and Flores, 2004. Both follow-up surveys were targeted for 
baseline respondents thus there are some households that participated in 2001 but not 
in 2002 and vice-versa, causing the balanced panel to consist of 1,359 households 
instead of 1,397.   35 
Table 2. F-statistic for the regression of observables on attrition and treatment using the 
baseline survey (year 2000) 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables  Attrition  Treatment 










Requested a loan 




Existence of a microenterprise 




Value of durable and non-durable goods 








Household’s annual per capita consumption 








Access to remittances 




Value of annual remittances 








Participation in community organizations 










Household  member  participation  in  social 






F-statistic  3.430***  1.840** 
Number of observations  1,581  1,359 
Significant at the 90%*, 95%** and 99%*** confidence level. OLS standard errors 
are in parenthesis 
a Dummy for whether the household requested a loan in the 12 months prior to the 
survey 
b Dummy for whether there existed a microenterprise in the household or not 
c Value of goods such as agricultural tools, furniture, sowing machines, vehicles, etc. 
in thousands of Cordobas 
d In thousands of Cordobas 
e Dummy for whether the household received help in kind or in cash from relatives or 
friends living outside the community during the previous 12 months 
f Average annual value of remittances (including in kind) received in thousands of 
Cordobas 
g Dummy for whether household members participated in home community 
organizations related to technical training, religion, sports, women empowerment, 
among others 
h Dummy for whether any household member received benefits from social programs 
other than RPS carried out by local NGOs or other government offices 
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Table  3.  Mean  difference  test  for  non-attritors  and  attritors  and  for  control  and 
treatment groups in the baseline survey (year 2000).  








Average age of household members 
Mean  23.03  23.52  22.20  23.81 
t-statistic  -0.48  -2.60*** 
p-value  0.63  0.01 
Percentage of households that requested a loan 
Mean  17.9  15.3  19.91  16.0 
t-statistic  0.97  1.87* 
p-value  0.33  0.06 
Percentage of households that report having a microenterprise 
Mean  12.29  13.06  11.48  13.03 
t-statistic  -0.32  -0.87 
p-value  0.75  0.37 
Percentage of households participating in community organizations 
Mean  20.60  15.31  20.50  20.68 
t-statistic  1.99**  -0.07 
p-value  0.05  0.94 
Value of durable and non-durables (Cordobas) 
Mean  399.16  297.54  375.11  421.41 
t-statistic  1.70*  -0.80 
p-value  0.09  0.42 
Per capita annual consumption (Cordobas) 
Mean  3,885.08  3,854.27  3,738.24  4,020.90 
t-statistic  0.14  -1.83* 
p-value  0.89  0.07 
Average number of members living in the household 
Mean  6.18  5.94  6.31  6.07 
t-statistic  1.02  1.46 
p-value  0.31  0.14 
Percentage of households that received benefits from social programs other than RPS 
Mean  47.83  27.93  50.07  45.75 
t-statistic  6.01***  1.59 
p-value  <0.01  0.11 
Number of social programs other than RPS that benefited households 
Mean  0.83  0.44  0.83  0.82 
t-statistic  6.28***  0.11 
p-value  <0.01  0.91 
Percentage of households with access to remittances 
Mean  0.06  0.09  0.07  0.06 
t-statistic  -1.08  0.93 
p-value  0.28  0.35 
Value of remittances per year (Cordobas) 
Mean  131.08  166.46  121.77  139.69 
t-statistic  -0.37  -0.23 
p-value  0.71  0.81 
Significant at the *90%, **95% and 99%*** confidence level.   37 
Table 4. Frequency of remittances sent by migrants during 2000, 2001 and 2002. 
  2000 (%)  2001 (%)  2002 (%) 
Biweekly  17.10  11.25  10.89 
Monthly  25.00  32.50  44.55 
Trimester  26.31  18.75  13.86 
Semester  21.05  16.25  17.82 
Annually  10.53  21.25  12.87 
Number of migrants 
sending remittances 
to households back 
home 




during the year 
52 (60)  63 (76)  88 (100) 
All numbers are percentages, except for the last two rows, which refer to number of 
households. The numbers in parenthesis are the percentage of households that received 
remittances from the total that reported access to remittances   38 
Table 5. DD parameters using equation (5) to estimate CCT impact on credit request 
using the balanced and unbalanced panel. 
Parameter  Credit request with 
unbalanced panel 
Credit request with 
balanced panel 


























Number of observations  4,431  4,077 
Significant  at  the  *  90%,  **  95%  and  ***  99%  confidence  level.  Bootstrapped 
standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
   39 
Table  6.  Determinants  of  access  to  remittances  and  the  request  of  a  loan  at  the 
household level using two-way fixed effects as shown in equation (7). 
































































Value of durable and non-






















Proxy of migrant 




-  0.006 
(0.006) 














Access to remittances  -  0.266** 
(0.105) 
- 
Number of observations  4,077  4,077  3,387 
Significant at the * 90%, ** 95% and *** 99% confidence level. Standard errors from 
GLS are shown in parenthesis. 
a  Second  stage  regression  for  the  decision  to  request  a  loan  using  the  complete 
balanced panel, which includes households with and without access to remittances 
during each of the years observed 
b  Second  stage  regression  for  the  decision  to  request  a  loan  for  the  subgroup  of 
households in the balanced panel that did not receive remittances in any of the years 
observed 
c Dummy whether the owned the home plot with or without title 
d Whether the household suffered a shock related to theft, lack of work, low yield, 
presence of drought or flood and bad coffee prices 
e The proxy is the percentage of households in the home community participating in 
migration 
   40 
Table 7. Percentage of households that were benefited by social programs other than RPS 
during the period 2000 to 2002 
  Percentage of households benefited by social programs 
other than RPS* 
Program type  2000  2001  2002 
Provision of school 
supplies for children  63.9  13.9  19.9 
Free meal to children 
during class at primary 
schools 
24.8  71.5  83.6 
Health workshops  20.2  23.8  4.3 
Provision of free seed and 
fertilizer  19.2  0.0  9.7 
Provision of food supplies 
to households  0.0  7.3  5.5 
Total number of 
households  1,359  1,359  1,359 
*Many households participated in more than one of these programs   41 
Table  8.  Determinants  of  access  to  remittances  and  the  request  of  a  loan  at  the 
household level adding time-community fixed effects to equation (7). 
































































Value of durable and non-






















Proxy of migrant 




-  0.006 
(0.004) 














Access to remittances  -  0.524** 
(0.265) 
- 
Number of observations  4,077  4,077  3,387 
Significant at the * 90%, ** 95% and *** 99% confidence level. Standard errors from 
GLS are shown in parenthesis. 
a  Second  stage  regression  for  the  decision  to  request  a  loan  using  the  complete 
balanced panel, which includes households with and without access to remittances 
during each of the years observed 
b  Second  stage  regression  for  the  decision  to  request  a  loan  for  the  subgroup  of 
households in the balanced panel that did not receive remittances in any of the years 
observed 
c Dummy whether the owned the home plot with or without title 
d Whether the household suffered a shock related to theft, lack of work, low yield, 
presence of drought or flood and bad coffee prices 
e The proxy is the percentage of households in the home comarca participating in 
migration 
 
 